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Abstract
The subject of this paper is to examine the role of morality in foreign policy 
decision making and action, while its goal is to argue that (1) morality plays 
an important role in the creation of foreign policy, and (2) that it is not pos-
sible to formulate a credible and intelligible foreign policy decision without 
moral considerations. In order to argue this point the author relies on the 
theoretical framework set by Edward Hallet Carr in his groundbreaking 
book The Twenty Years Crisis (1946), and reinforce his conclusions with 
an examination of one of the pivotal passages of Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian War, the famous Funeral Oration delivered by the Athenian 
statesman Pericles. In conclusion, the author claims that even in interna-
tional relations are completely amoral, as they are in the realist account, 
that foreign policy cannot be, due to the inability of formulating foreign 
policy without moral considerations.
Key words: morality, national interest, foreign policy, Carr, realism, Thucy-
dides, funeral oration 
Introduction
The practice of both domestic and foreign politics is commonly regarded as a Mach-
iavellian enterprise, in which moral rules, outcomes, or moral sentiment play either 
an insignificant role, or are potentially considered dangerous for politicians and the 
people they represent. Even when moral reasons are used to justify a certain decision 
or action, a Machiavellian would argue that they should be used only as a veneer, in 
order to obscure the true reasons of political action (Strauss 1972; Machiavelli, 2005; 
King, 2007; Nederman, 2009). Therefore, the subject of this paper is to examine the 
role of morality in foreign policy decision making and action, while its goal is to ar-
gue that (1) morality plays an important role in the creation of foreign policy, and (2) 
that it is not possible to formulate a credible and intelligible foreign policy decision 
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without moral considerations. In order to argue this point we will rely on the theoret-
ical framework set by Edward Hallett Carr in his groundbreaking book The Twenty 
Years Crisis (1946), and reinforce his conclusions with an examination of one of the 
pivotal passages of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, the famous Funeral 
Oration delivered by the Athenian statesman Pericles. Prior to this however, we offer 
an overview of possibilities for the relationship between one of realism’s central con-
cepts – the national interest – and morality. In conclusion, it is claimed that even if 
international relations are completely amoral, as they are in the realist account, that 
foreign policy cannot be, due to the inability of formulating foreign policies without 
moral considerations.
National interests and morality – possible modalities within their 
relationship
In his article Morality and “the National Interest” David Welch (2000) identifies a 
minimum of four positions that have evolved through the history of international re-
lations on the question of this relationship.
On the first position morality and the national interest represent “fundamentally 
different imperatives,” meaning that whenever morality exerts an influence on foreign 
policy or provides a base for foreign policy, the national interest is excluded from do-
ing the same. The process, of course, goes both ways. If circumstances should allow for 
them to coexist in any foreign policy decision, there is still no necessary connection 
between them, and their coexistence is entirely fortuitous. National interests are, of 
course, the primary concern.
The second position is quite different, and says there is absolutely no tension be-
tween morality and the national interest. What is in the national interest is by the fact 
itself the moral thing to do. But not all moral actions have to be in the national interest. 
Namely, the concept of national interest is the moral concept that outweighs all other 
moral concepts in international relations and foreign policy, making it the primary 
moral duty of the statesman to uphold it. 
The third view states that morality and national interests are simply different ways 
of considering international relations. The former is concerned with what is right or 
wrong, while the latter examines what is advantageous and disadvantageous. But, just 
as it has become popular to claim about the relationship between morality and profit 
in business ethics, proponents of the third view say that morality and national inter-
ests “empirically coincide,” meaning that the best way to look out for a state’s national 
interests in the long run is by making morally right decisions. 
The fourth view says that the concept of the national interest does have a moral 
content, but that foreign policy based in that concept will, more or less frequently, “fail 
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the test of morality.” This is quite different from the second view, because it admits 
both that national interests are intertwined with moral interests and have a moral 
content, and can still lead to immoral actions. Though such occasions may be consid-
ered tragic, it is still the duty of the statesman to see the tragedy through by setting 
his personal moral feelings aside and ensuring the security and survival of the state. 
On the second view, there would have been no moral dilemma. Any decision rooted 
in the national interest would have been a priori viewed as the morally right decision. 
In other words, the difference between the second and fourth view is that while the 
second sees the morality of a given situation as merely ephemeral to what is really the 
case, the fourth view allows moral considerations to have a real effect on foreign policy 
decisions, even if they cannot outweigh the importance of national interests.
The question remains, though, is there any practical difference to the application 
of these four different approaches to foreign policy decisions. It seems that regardless 
of how they view the relationship between morality and national interests, they rec-
ommend actions in accordance with the latter, except for the third view, which would 
actually advocate a moral point of view. But another important question remains un-
answered. What is “the national interest?” For one thing, when we “[...] speak of the na-
tional interest, we almost always mean the common good of the members of political 
communities organized as sovereign states [...]” (Welch, 2000: 7). But what constitutes 
this common good, and thus, what really constitutes states’ national interests? Well, 
as Welch continues to explain, the term itself “denotes at the very least the survival 
of the state.” But, while “[...] this may be a national interest, however, it does not seem 
to be an adequate understanding of the national interest” (ibid: 8). This is because the 
very survival of a state is rarely endangered. This, in turn, means that the concept can 
be stretched to denote whatever a particular politician or theorist wants it to denote 
at a given moment. It could thus denote the amount of money a state has, or its inter-
national reputation, or the self-respect that the citizens of that state have because they 
are morally comfortable with its foreign policy. So while a minimal definition of the 
national interest as survival is generally accepted it does not seem to provide anyone 
with clear guidelines on how to actually make foreign policy decisions. How does one 
decide what the national interest is when one needs to make a foreign policy decision 
that (hard as it may be) doesn’t directly threaten the survival of the state. Obviously, 
at that point the national interest is what anyone decides it is, whether it be financial 
stability, international reputation, or even the moral reputation of the state. Welch 
addresses this as the problem of “indeterminate policy guidance” (ibid). Secondly, for-
eign policy decisions are rarely or never in the interest of the entire citizenry of a state. 
Thirdly, the term ‘national interest’ itself can easily be used to mask which particular 
values politicians want to promote or sacrifice. It can therefore be easily used as a 
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moral standard which, while not inconceivable, seems rather hypocritical. Fourthly, 
and perhaps most importantly, 
[...] the phrase is superfluous. We can always do without it. We can describe the 
stakes, goals, and values implicated in any foreign policy choice in plain language, 
and we can do so in a way that is more precise and more helpful than if we subsume 
them all under the rubric of a single generic term. At no point in the description, 
explanation, prediction, or advocacy of foreign policy do we need to invoke “the 
national interest,” and never do we gain by doing so (ibid: 9).
As much as there may be reasons for actually abandoning the concept itself, the 
national interest is not likely to stop being a common and important part of the lan-
guage of international politics and foreign policy. What is important though, is that 
the explanation that morality is not “fit” for international relations and foreign policy 
because it is not in accord with the national interests of states has been contested for 
two reasons: (1) it is not clear what the concept of national interest(s) definitively is, 
except if we take a minimal view of it, in which case it becomes useless for most foreign 
policy decision making processes; (2) regardless of which of the four realist views of-
fered on the relationship between morality and national interests we may choose to 
believe, none of them prove that the exclusion of moral judgment from foreign policy 
is necessary or even in the national interest. 
In the following part of the paper, we will show E. H. Carr’s arguments, in order 
to show that regardless of the realist’s amoral description of power relations in inter-
national politics, foreign policies cannot be formulated without moral considerations.
E. H. Carr and the ineffectiveness of realism 
Edward Hallett Carr is best known for his comprehensive critique of Western di-
plomacy in the early 20th century, and the framework he creates in this critique has 
strong realist characteristics (Griffits et al., 2009: 9). In his most famous book The 
Twenty Years Crisis he attacks the idealist position, which he refers to as “utopianism.” 
While Thucydides provided us with the first ever recorded realist-idealist debate in his 
Melian Dialogue, Carr gave perhaps the first comprehensive account of the idealist po-
sition itself, thus providing the framework for the entire debate. The idealist position 
is thus characterized by its faith in human reason, its confidence in progress, a sense 
of moral rectitude, and finally by a belief in the underlying harmony of state’ interests 
(Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). This means that the idealist believes that people are reason-
able and rational actors, and based on their reason they are able to identify their inter-
ests as harmonious. More to that, people are able to do this across state borders, which 
in turn means that states have common interests, and state behavior can be reasonable 
enough to achieve those interests in a peaceful way. Instead of increasing their power, 
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and “ruling wherever they can,” states can take care of their survival through institu-
tionalized forms of collective security. Carr was of course highly skeptical of both the 
idea of collective security and of the institutions that were designed to see to its imple-
mentation, such as the League of Nations. His concern was that the idea was based “[...] 
on the erroneous assumption that the territorial and political status quo was satisfac-
tory to all the major powers in the international system” (Griffits et al., 2009: 10). This 
also shows that the idealist’s belief about the underlying harmony of interests among 
states is misconceived. It means that conflicts among states are not based merely in the 
institutional and bureaucratic failure to facilitate good communication among states 
and bring about an understanding of their common interests. Conflicts are the direct 
result of the imbalance of power in the international system. Furthermore, it means 
that such conflict cannot be resolved by appealing to universal moral principles, but by 
negotiating for a more balanced structure of power. 
Whether or not Carr’s critique of idealist thinking is completely accurate is beside 
the point at this moment. What matters it that regardless of his critique, Carr’s ap-
proach is far more nuanced than the paradigmatic, full-bodied approach to realism 
that we mentioned before (Molloy, 2006: 51). “Delving into the works of Carr, one 
becomes more aware of the inadequacy of textbook definitions of Realism when com-
pared to the complex theory presented by Carr in The Twenty Years’ Crisis [...]” (ibid: 
52). At times it even seems that the only thing invariably linking him to the realist 
camp is his insistence on power as the primary driver of international relations. Carr 
did not believe that a prudent foreign policy, or a prudent politician for that matter, 
can forsake all moral considerations from his decision-making processes and behav-
ior. This especially applies to conflicts and crises since these were the central problems 
that he was trying to address. 
Carr suggests that the idealist approach, or as he calls it, the “utopian” approach to 
international relations, is immature. However, he holds that in its pure form, realism 
is completely sterile. While he contends that the first task of any political thinker is to 
expose the immature nature of idealist principles, he believes that pure realism, what 
we called full-bodied realism, cannot offer a final solution to the issues or internation-
al relations and international conflicts. In one of the most illuminating paragraphs of 
the entire Twenty Years’ Crisis he writes (1946: 89):
The impossibility of being a consistent and thorough-going realist is one of the 
most certain and most curious lessons of political science. Consistent realism ex-
cludes four things which appear to be essential ingredients of all effective politi-
cal thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment and a 
ground for action.
What is then, the importance of these ingredients of all political thinking? To start 
with the first, politics must have a finite goal. Carr contends that there is no pure 
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realist premise from which a finite political goal can be deduced. This means that one 
cannot create or even hope to create a political program based on pure realist think-
ing, and that in turn means that one cannot formulate a coherent foreign policy. He re-
marks that Machiavelli’s biggest problem was not in the immorality of the methods he 
proposed, but in the lack of content of the state, which exists merely to exist (ibid). This 
point goes a long way in emphasizing an issue that was addressed earlier in this paper. 
It is the issue of the importance of the survival of the state. A pure realist considers the 
survival of the state to be of axiomatic importance and would never ask why it is so 
important, because the answer cannot be attained by pure realist reasoning. However, 
both Carr and Machiavelli omit one drastically important point -- we do not merely 
lie to each other about our moral virtues and reasons for action, we lie to ourselves as 
well. For the wicked, the veneer of morality is not only external, but internal as well. 
As Game of Thrones character Edmure Tully (ET) put it to Jamie Lannister (JL), a po-
litically and morally corrupt character (Mylod, 2016): 
ET: You understand on some level; you understand that you’re an evil man.
JL: I’ll leave the judgments to the gods.
ET: Well, it’s convenient for you. Hm... You are a fine looking fellow - your square 
jaw, your golden armor. Tell me, I want to know, I truly do, how do you live with 
yourself? All of us have to believe that we’re decent, don’t we? We have to sleep 
at night. How do you tell yourself that you’re decent, after everything that you’ve 
done?
Second, these finite goals must be of such a character that they can create an emo-
tional appeal. For instance, a finite goal like winning a war and committing one’s 
resources to attaining that goal will not bear fruit unless an emotional appeal can be 
made to the public to which this goal applies. Ultimately, the cited passage from Game 
of Thrones applies here as well, because even if one considered international politics to 
be an amoral enterprise, they still need to consider themselves as “decent” and moral.
Third, and perhaps most important to this paper, politics must include the right 
of moral judgment. In other words, moral judgment must not be excluded from the 
processes of political and especially foreign policy decision making. Therefore, the old 
realist creed that might is right must be abandoned. Carr’s argument in support of this 
opinion is the following (1946: 91–92):
The belief that whatever succeeds is right, and has only to be understood to be ap-
proved, must, if consistently held, empty thought of purpose, and thereby sterilize 
it and ultimately destroy it. [...] The necessity, recognized by all politicians, both 
in domestic and in international affairs, for cloaking interests in a guise of moral 
principles is in itself a symptom of the inadequacy of realism.
What Carr is trying to say here is that maintaining the belief that moral judgment 
can have no place in foreign affairs and international relations is both purposeless 
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and hypocritical. Even if politicians use moral principles only to disguise their true 
intentions, they still use them, proving that a pure realist foreign policy is impossible 
to maintain.
Fourth, political thought or any theory that guides a political decision maker, must 
provide concrete grounds for political action. Realism in international relations does 
not provide us with such grounds. One might say that the theoretical realist is like a 
non-interventionist divinity. Based on what he thinks of a state’s status on the inter-
national stage, and the interests he attributes to all states, Carr says, the realist can 
establish a perfect chain of cause and effect and give a “scientific prediction” of what 
will follow (ibid: 92). Because of this the realist is completely devoid of purpose1 and 
thus cannot provide decision making processes and state behavior with any concrete 
grounds for action. This is another important point for this paper because it correlates 
very well to the aforementioned problem of the concept of national interests stated by 
David Welch. Namely, it only provides us with very “indeterminate policy guidance” 
(Welch, 2000: 3). 
Carr’s conclusion is that “utopianism” is useless because it only provides a disguise 
for the interests of the privileged, and it is the duty of every realist to expose it for what 
it truly represents. Moral values are only introduced into the international arena, Carr 
believes, once power is consolidated by a certain number of states, and it is those states 
that appeal to morality in order to help preserve the status quo. However, pure realism 
itself provides one with a never-ending struggle for power which makes the peace-
ful coexistence of peoples impossible. Therefore, a sound policy can only be one that 
is successful in finding the balance between the idealist and realist principles (Carr, 
1946: 94). The same can be better described as the balance between ideas and institu-
tions. Whereas political ideas are a highly utopian element filled with moral meaning, 
political institutions tend to embrace more realist philosophies in their behavior. This 
is so because one side emphasizes morality while the other emphasizes power, and it is 
precisely the balance between morality and power that is so important for the states-
man to discover and rediscover every step of the way. However, since we cannot mor-
alize power and we cannot expel power from politics we are left with a dilemma that 
cannot be completely resolved. As Carr puts it, the ideal can never be institutionalized 
and the institutions can never be idealized (ibid: 100).
The gravity of the situation is most obvious when it comes to military power and 
war. Carr regards military power to be of supreme importance, because the ultimate 
resort of all unsettled political disputes is war. So, potential war is the dominant factor 
in international politics (ibid: 109). This line of reasoning leads Carr to an astonishing 
1 ... and it is statesmen that tend to see themselves as „burdened with glorious purpose.“ as the charac-
ter of Look in: Whedon, J. 2012. Avengers. Marvel.
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(or not so astonishing) conclusion about foreign policy and war. Namely, that foreign 
policy neither can nor should ever be separated from strategy. Military power thus 
becomes not merely an instrument of the state but an end in itself, and because mil-
itary power, or at least the status of being a military power, is mostly attained by the 
waging of war itself, wars of limited objective have become almost impossible to wage 
in modern conditions (ibid: 111). Does this mean that war and other phenomena as-
sociated with international relations cannot be judged by any moral standards? Does 
it mean that state behavior cannot be assessed on a moral, as well as on a legal and 
strategic basis? And if the function of morality is simply to help maintain the status 
quo, should it not be expelled from international relations and foreign policy? 
It seems that Carr’s answer to all of these questions is negative, regardless of the 
fact that he is commonly regarded as a realist. Namely, he regards the claim that states 
can and should act morally as a hypothesis, and he provides proof in favor of the 
hypothesis by saying: “So long as statesmen, and others who influence the conduct 
of international affairs, agree in thinking that the state has [moral] duties, and allow 
this view to guide their action, the hypothesis remains effective” (ibid: 152). Morality 
can play an important role in international relations not because it should but simply 
because it does. So when the realist contends that morality does not play a role in inter-
national relations he is wrong; it does play a role even if it does so only in the manner 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy – it plays a role because we believe or want it to play a role, 
while in foreign policy it remains important because we cannot formulate a foreign 
policy without it. The idealist or “utopian” on the other hand, believes that states are 
both domestically and internationally subjected to the same moral obligations, and 
thus the same moral considerations as individuals. This, Carr believes, is also not pos-
sible, and again it is because we generally do not believe it to be possible. Philosophers 
often wish to prove a point conclusively, but when it comes to politics, especially in-
ternational politics, it seems that the measure of truth is quite relative. In fact, it is so 
relative that it rests contently in the hands of politicians and ordinary people. So, if a 
philosopher’s beliefs, whether they are those of a realist or those of an idealist, cannot 
be accepted, or do not correspond to the public opinion, they are most probably false. 
“The fact is that most people, while believing that states ought to act morally, do not 
expect from them the same kind of moral behavior, which they expect from them-
selves and one another” (ibid: 156). So, there is a binding international moral code 
because states, or the individuals within those states, believe in it. Any such code is of 
course minimal. For instance, while it is morally praiseworthy of individuals to help 
others even at the expense of their own safety, it is not commonly expected of states to 
“[...] indulge in altruism at the cost of any serious sacrifice of its interests. [...] The ac-
cepted standard of international morality in regard to the altruistic virtues appears to 
be that a state should indulge in them in so far as it is not seriously incompatible with 
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its more important interests” (ibid: 158–159). We should, however, remind ourselves, 
that Carr also tells us that those same interests cannot be properly formulated without 
the application of morality.
To conclude, Carr is a realist, yet he is not a realist in the sense in which he would 
claim that he has a theory that is able to explain everything that happens in interna-
tional relations based on theoretical deduction from a set of principles. He is a real-
ist in the sense that he is a political conservative, thus believing that utopian ideals 
cannot form the fabric of international politics, nor can they effectively inform the 
rules of military engagement. However, as a political conservative, he is also unable 
to accept the principles of realism in foreign, if those principles are left unchecked by 
conservative political prudence, which in turn occasionally involves moral consider-
ations. Finally, he is a realist because he ultimately believes in the primacy of power 
over morality, and national interests over moral judgment, although he would never 
consider the exclusion of morality from foreign policy to be prudent. 
Pericles and the importance of moral reasoning
In order to further the argument, we will invoke several passages from the author who 
is widely considered as the father of the entire realist tradition in international rela-
tions – Thucydides. So far, we have claimed 
 – that laws, if they are in power long enough, can and do create customs which in 
turn influence the moral values, practices, habits and feelings that are instru-
mental to the functioning of a society;
 – that the mail goal of states is survival, but that the state does have some content 
and purpose – it does not exist merely to exist.
A particular way of life that a people within a state have is mostly influenced by 
the customs and laws of that state. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that fear for 
the survival of the state is, in fact, a moral reason for making foreign policy decisions. 
Nowhere is this sentiment better expressed than in the funeral oration delivered by 
Pericles (431 B. C. E.), one of the centerpieces of the History of the Peloponnesian War. 
“It has come down from antiquity in Thucydides’ version as one of the most eloquent 
of oratorical performances and a lasting expression of the Athenian civilization that it 
celebrates and memorializes” (Zagorin, 2005: 64).
After the first year of the war, a public funeral for the honored dead who had fallen 
in the first battles was organized in Athens. As was customary for public funerals a 
high dignitary was chosen to deliver an oration in honor of the fallen. On this occasion 
it was delivered by Pericles, the leader of the Athenian democracy, and was also used to 
justify the war effort and to homogenize the public in their approval of the Athenian 
war effort. So, when Pericles speaks of Athenian democracy, and the way of life that 
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was bequeathed to them by their ancestors, “[...] free to the present time by their valour 
[...],” (Thucydides, 2004: 82) he speaks of something that is worth preserving at any 
cost. When he mentions the honored dead, it is clear that they are honored because 
they chose “[...] to die resisting, rather than live submitting” (ibid: 85). It is because of 
a peoples’ belief in the inherent worth of their way of life that the survival of the state 
must be defended, even by acts of war and sacrifices of death. Sacrifice is a moral de-
cision.
It is impossibly difficult to choose only one part of the oration as representative of 
all the sentiments Pericles expresses. Yet the belief that the Athenians had in the worth 
of their way of life and the character developed by living in an environment of demo-
cratic freedoms is well expressed in the following passage (Thucydides, 2008: 92–93):2 
We cultivate beauty without extravagance, and intellect without loss of [vigor]; 
wealth is for us the gateway to action, not the subject of boastful talk, and while 
there is no disgrace in the admission of poverty, the real disgrace lies in the failure 
to take active measures to escape it; our politicians can combine management of 
their domestic affairs with state business, and others who have their own work to 
attend to can nevertheless acquire a good knowledge of politics. We are unique in 
the way we regard anyone who takes no part in public affairs: we do not call that a 
quiet life, we call it a useless life. [...] In summary I declare that our city as a whole 
is an education to Greece; and in each individual among us I see combined the per-
sonal self-sufficiency to enjoy the widest range of experience and the ability to adapt 
with consummate grace and ease. That this is no passing puff but factual reality is 
proved by the very power of the city: this character of ours built that power.
If anything is clear from this rather boastful passage, it is that the Athenians do not 
wish to part from their way of life, and their customs and laws because they consider 
them the best (possible) ones. However, even though the praise a Spartan statesman 
would sing in favor of his own state might rely on quite different qualities, as is true 
if we take the different qualities of states in any period in history, praise would none-
theless be sung. The Spartan feels that his way of life is superior, or sacred, or at least 
worthwhile and he does not wish to part with it. This is true for peoples in all states, at 
least if they are persuaded to feel so by illustrious speeches such as that of Pericles was. 
And because the survival of the state is inextricably connected to one’s way of life, in 
terms of laws and customs, peoples of all states are willing to defend the state’s survival 
with any means that policy may bequeath them with, even war. This is the message we 
can read out of Pericles’ funeral oration.
Pericles is attempting to move the crowd towards an important foreign policy de-
cision – to commit more human and material resources into the war effort. Although 
2  A different translation of the History was used to extract the longer quoted passages because the 
translation seems more understandable to the modern reader.
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a later part of the gives us a blatantly realist vision of Athenian action (the famous 
Melian Dialogue), Pericles’ oration is everything but realist. In fact, it contains moral 
judgment, it is emotionally appealing, and it certainly gives grounds for action. Even 
if we look at the famous Melian Dialogue, a purely realist interpretation can hardly 
stand. Namely, the Athenians are portrayed as saying (Thucydides, 2008: 304):
We believe it of the gods, and we know it for sure of men, that under some perma-
nent compulsion of nature wherever they can rule, they will. We did not make this 
law; it was already laid down, and we are not the first to follow it; we inherited it as 
a fact, and we shall pass it on as a fact to remain true for ever; and we follow it in the 
knowledge that you and anyone else given the same power as us would do the same.
However, the problem with Thucydides’ point of view here, as Michael Walzer sees 
it, is that it is the point of view of a historian, not a historical actor, and it is from the 
perspective of the actor that the moral point of view derives its legitimacy (Walzer, 
2006: 8). In fact, the point of view uttered by the Athenian generals seems to be overly 
abstract to be employed by actual historical actors, but rather sounds like the opinion 
of a historian and philosopher. The decision itself to destroy the population of Melos 
after it was conquered is merely given to us as a finished product, and portrayed in 
terms of necessity. However, Thucydides does not tell us anything about how the deci-
sion was brought in the Athenian assembly and how the argument for the destruction 
of the island (“the Melian decree”) won the day (ibid). It is hard to believe that every 
single member of that assembly immediately took for granted any such arguments. 
Namely, the argument that invokes necessity could not have been taken with abso-
lute certainty, like the falling of a stone with nothing to support it, but rather as an 
argument about the probabilities and risks of future action. And as Walzer himself 
put it, “[...] such arguments are always arguable. Would the destruction of Melos re-
ally reduce Athenian risks? Are there alternative policies? What are the likely costs 
of this one? Would it be right? What would other people think of Athens if it were 
carried out?” (ibid). Such arguments are certainly not won by necessity, but rather by 
debate, and such debate usually involves some kind of moral consideration, and there 
seems to be no contradiction between that view and the view of war being merely a 
continuation of policy, as we had Clausewitz put it in the beginning. Unfortunately, 
Thucydides does not tell us how the argument was won, but what has been said so far 
should be more than enough to conclude that the decision was actually debated, and 
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Conclusion
To conclude, if Carr’s stance on the role of morality in foreign policy can stand any 
scrutiny, then the application of realist thinking to the description international pol-
itics, as one level of analysis, and to foreign policy as another, seems to present us 
with an interesting paradox. Namely, the realist description of power relations be-
tween states could be true, yet it would still be impossible to create foreign policy with 
complete disregard to moral considerations. This paradox (if it is, indeed, a paradox) is 
interesting because the aforementioned realist claim that “[…] there are no significant 
moral relationships between nations the way there are between people who live in a 
society […]” (Fotion, 2000: 18) could be completely true, without making any differ-
ence to the influence of moral considerations on foreign policy. This, in turn, means 
that a foreign policy that is informed by moral considerations does not need to rely 
on an idealist view of international politics, and does not need to establish any sort 
of harmony of interests between states, or for that matter, any kind of welt ethos. One 
state may consider the actions and/or decisions of another as immoral, as the moral 
beliefs within their societies may differ; a realists description of the position of those 
two states within the power structure of international politics may be amoral; but for-
eign policy decisions within any given country will be based in (among others) moral 
considerations.
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Carr kao Tukididov “ghostwriter”: 
paradoks realizma i moralna vanjska politika 
Sažetak
Predmet teksta je uloga moralnih vrijednosti u vanjskopolitičkom odluči-
vanju i djelovanju, a cilj je argumentirati da (1) moralne vrijednosti imaju 
važnu ulogu u stvaranju vanjskih politika te da (2) nije moguće formulira-
ti vjerodostojnu i razumljivu vanjsku politiku bez moralnih razmatranja. 
Kako bi isto tvrdio autor se oslanja na teorijski okvir iz Dvadesetogodišnje 
krize (1946) Edward Hallet Carra, a svoje zaključke pojačava istraživanjem 
jednog od najpoznatijih dijelova Tukididove Povijesti Peloponeskog rata, 
poznatog Periklova nekrologa. Zaključno autor tvrdi da čak i kad bi među-
narodni odnosi bili potpuno amoralni, kao što su predstavljeni u realistič-
koj teoriji međunarodnih odnosa, vanjska politika zbog nemogućnosti vla-
stite formulacije bez moralnih razmatranja, sama ne može biti amoralna.
Ključne riječi: moralne vrijednosti, nacionalni interes, vanjska politika, 
Carr, realizam, Tukidid, nekrolog
